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A recent study of retail industries near the U.S.–Canada border measures how quickly
new competition arrives after an increase in demand.
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In this Chicago Fed Letter, we describe our
recent research on the effects of real ex-
change rates on the number of produc-
ers and their average employment in U.S.
retail trade industries located near the
U.S.–Canada border.1 Our results yield
new measures of the speed with which
new producers enter retail trade indus-
tries following demand shocks. Microeco-
nomic theory assumes that the number
of producers is fixed immediately after
an increase in demand and that poten-
tial entrants can only take advantage of
the resulting profit opportunity with the
passage of time. Our estimates of the
speed of entry quantify the time required
for this transition from the short run
to the long run. In three of the four in-
dustries we examine, this time is at most
one year. Thus, changes in the number
of producers contribute to these indus-
tries’ cyclical fluctuations.
There are few observable counterparts
to the textbook experiment of shifting
an industry’s demand curve while leav-
ing its supply curve unchanged. Instead,
most observable shocks—such as chang-
es to monetary policy and exchange
rates—impact both demand and supply.
For example, consider an industry’s
response to an unexpected devaluation
in the dollar relative to the euro. This
makes European producers’ goods more
expensive, so it increases demand for
U.S. producers’ goods. However, the
devaluation also increases the cost of
U.S. producers’ inputs imported from
Europe. This cost increase reduces the
supply forthcoming from U.S. produc-
ers at any given price, and so mitigates
the demand effect. Goldberg and Campa
document that movements in the ex-
change rate significantly impact manu-
facturing industries through both of
these channels.2 The expected indus-
try growth following the dollar’s deval-
uation may fail to materialize because
the expansion of demand has been off-
set by a contraction in supply. For this
reason, exchange rate fluctuations are
not directly useful for measuring in-
dustries’ responses to demand shocks.
To overcome this difficulty, we use a
unique natural experiment to disen-
tangle the demand and supply effects
of exchange rate shocks on retailers
located on the U.S.–Canada border.
Because dollar-denominated prices ad-
just only slowly to exchange rate changes,
a change in the exchange rate causes
the same good to sell for different real
prices on opposite sides of this border.
Subsequently, both countries’ border
residents shift their expenditures toward
the cheaper country, thereby increas-
ing demand in its border area. The same
exchange rate change also affects re-
tailers’ costs and hence industry sup-
ply, but this cost effect is likely to be
shared by all retailers. This allows us to
use an experimental methodology in
our measurement, where retailers from
interior areas serve as a control group
for a treatment group of retailers near
the border. Differences between the
responses of the treatment and control
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groups to a change in the exchange
rate isolate its demand effects on the
treatment group.
We apply this methodology to four in-
dustries (by SIC industry)—Food Stores,
Gasoline Service Stations, Eating Places,
and Drinking Places—using 20 years
of county-level observations of the num-
ber of employers in each industry and
their average employment. Our results
indicate that the creation and destruc-
tion of new producers play substantial
roles in three industries’ immediate and




Our use of real exchange rate fluctua-
tions to measure responses to demand
shocks relies on two assumptions. First,
movements in the real exchange rate
do not present arbitrage opportunities
that would cause U.S. border retailers’
costs to systematically differ from those
of their counterparts in the country’s
interior. This allows retail industries in
the interior to serve as a control group
import small quantities of goods for per-
sonal use. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how
consumers take advantage of price dif-
ferences to shift their expenditures to-
ward the low-price country. Figure 1
depicts the Canada–U.S. real exchange
rate between 1977 and 1996, normalized
to equal one in 1977. This is the two cur-
rencies’ market exchange rate multiplied
by the ratio of their consumer price in-
dices (CPIs). Hence, it measures the pur-
chasing power of the Canadian dollar
after being exchanged for U.S. dollars
and spent in the U.S. The Canadian dol-
lar’s real value (in the U.S.) dropped sub-
stantially between 1977 and 1985. This
decline reversed in the late 1980s, but
this proved to be temporary. Between
1991 and 1996, the Canadian dollar lost
20% of its real value in the U.S.
Figure 2 plots the number of trips from
one country to the other that last one
day or less. This variable is the official
measure of cross-border shoppers used
by Canadian government agencies. Dur-
ing the appreciation of the Canadian
dollar between 1986 and 1992, the num-
ber of Canadian one-day trips increased
dramatically, reaching a peak of approx-
imately 59 million during 1991. The
flow of cross-border shoppers reversed
direction when the Canadian dollar sub-
sequently depreciated: American one-
day trips to Canada climbed from 19
million in 1992 to nearly 24 million in
1996. The spike in American trips in
1980 and 1981 came at a time when the
Canadian National Energy Policy sub-
sidized petroleum imports and taxed
exports. These policies greatly reduced
the price of gasoline in Canada relative
to the U.S., and American consumers
took advantage of the opportunity to
fill their tanks tax-free. The export tax
was much more easily enforced against
large tanker trucks, so the same price
difference presented no arbitrage op-
portunity to wholesalers.
The extent and timing of cross-border
shopping indicates that wholesale arbi-
trage does not eliminate international
price differences near the border. That
is, it is considerably easier for consumers
to shift their expenditures on retail goods
and services than it is for retailers to
shift their expenditures on inputs.
Data and methodology
Our observations of retail trade indus-
tries come from the U.S. Census’ annu-
al publication, County Business Patterns
(CBP) from 1977 through 1996. In each
county and for each of the four indus-
tries we consider, the CBP reports the
industry’s March employment and the
total number of establishments with em-
ployment during the year. These two
variables are the basic objects of our anal-
ysis. We focus on counties in the ten
contiguous states that border Canada,
so that the interior counties are other-
wise as similar as possible to the border
counties, and on counties with popula-
tions greater than 20,000 people, as mea-
sured in the 1990 decennial census. There
are 256 such counties in the ten states,
and 19 of them share a border with
Canada. The data from these counties
comprise our sample.
Figure 3 provides an impression of our
data for one industry, Gasoline Service.
Panel A plots the number of establish-
ments (in logarithms) in the border and
interior counties. Panel B plots the log-
arithms of employment per establish-
ment (average employment) in border
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for those on the border. Second, these
same movements induce border area
consumers to shift their expenditures
between U.S. and Canadian border re-
tailers. Consumers’ observed cross-bor-
der shopping decisions reinforce both
of these assumptions.
U.S. and Canadian consumers can cross
the border for recreational purposes,
subject only to a (usually) brief customs
inspection. Furthermore, they canMichael H. Moskow, President; William C. Hunter,
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and interior counties. Both panels also
contain the logarithm of the relative
price of gasoline between the U.S. and
Canada. This series was calculated as
the two countries’ exchange rate mul-
tiplied by the ratio of Canada’s CPI for
gasoline to that from the U.S.
Between 1977 and 1981, the price of
gas in Canada fell 44% relative to the
U.S. During this period of high oil prices,
the number of Gas Service establish-
ments declined in both border and in-
terior counties, but the decline was much
greater in border counties. There were
30% fewer establishments in border
counties in 1981 than in 1977, and the
corresponding number for interior
counties is 20%. If we use the interior
counties as a control group for the bor-
der counties, then the treatment of
shifting demand for gasoline away from
the U.S. resulted in a 10% drop in es-
tablishments. In contrast, Gasoline Ser-
vice’s average employment in border
and interior counties was nearly iden-
tical. Thus, it appears that retail gaso-
line industries in border counties shrank
and recovered through this period by
adjusting the number of establishments.
Between 1985 and 1991, when gasoline
became relatively cheap in the U.S., the
number of establishments in border coun-
ties grew by approximately 10%, while
the number in interior counties shrank
and in the number of establishments
were used in border counties’ retail gas-
oline industries to accommodate the de-
mand shifts due to cross-border shopping.
Movements in the number of establish-
ments were particularly important dur-
ing the oil-shock period, when Canadian
gasoline was very inexpensive.
Econometric results
To quantify the demand-shifting effects
of real exchange rates, we have estimat-
ed an econometric model in which the
number of establishments in a county
and their average employment depend
on their own values in the previous year
and a shock that is common to all coun-
ties. For border counties, the current
and past year’s real exchange rates also
influence both industry variables. The
presence of common shocks controls
for factors that influence retailers in
both border and interior counties, so
the estimated effects of real exchange
rates reflect only the demand effects
from cross-border shopping.
Because there is no reason to expect
our four industries to respond similarly
to the real exchange rate, we have esti-
mated our model for each of them. As
in figure 3, the real exchange rates are
industry specific. For example, we con-
struct the real exchange rate using the
two countries’ CPIs for Food Away from
Home when estimating the model for
Eating Places.
The model accommodates persistent
differences across counties in two ways.
First, we allow the average values (over
time) of the number of establishments
and their average employment to differ
across counties. Second, the influence
of the real exchange rate on a county’s
retail industry depends on the impor-
tance of the local Canadian market. Thus,
retail industries in a small U.S. county
located next to a larger Canadian city
(such as St. Clair County, Michigan, next
to Sarnia, Ontario) will respond more
to the real exchange rate than will their
counterparts in a large U.S. county with
a smaller Canadian counterpart (as in
Wayne County, Michigan, next to
Windsor, Ontario).
Figures 4 and 5 plot simulations from
the estimated models for two of the
industries we consider: Gasoline Service
and Eating Places. The latter includes
food service establishments with and
without table service. The blue lines
plot the responses of the number of
establishments serving a county to a
persistent increase in the real exchange
rate, and the black lines plot the re-
sponses of establishments’ average em-
ployment to the same disturbance. The
simulated paths for the number of
establishments and their average em-
ployment are expressed as percentage
differences from their initial values.
Because we measure the real exchange
rate as the value of the Canadian dollar
in the U.S., we expect these increases
to shift expenditures toward the U.S.,
expanding retail trade industries in bor-
der counties.3 The half-life of the real
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by 3%. Gasoline Service’s average em-
ployment grew in both border and in-
terior counties, but it grew by much
more (40% versus 20%) in border coun-
ties. Overall, figure 3 shows that chang-
es in both average establishment sizeService is 5.4 years and it is 2.4 years for
Eating Places. We chose the sizes of the
real exchange rate changes and their
half-lives to match the real exchange
rate’s variability and persistence in
our data.
The estimates for Gasoline Service re-
flect both the strong response of the
number of establishments to the peri-
od of cheap Canadian gasoline and
the adjustment of both variables in the
late 1980s as the price of gas increased.
Immediately following the real exchange
rate increase, the number of employ-
ees per establishment rises more than
1%, and the number of establishments
serving the industry declines slightly.
This decline is not statistically signifi-
cant. Thereafter, the increase in aver-
age employment persists as the number
of establishments rises. After five years,
the number of establishments has in-
creased by approximately 2%. Thus,
Gasoline Service’s transition from the
short run to the long run apparently be-
gins after one year. This is considerably
less than the half-life of the underlying
disturbance, so we conclude that vari-
ation in the number of establishments
is an important characteristic of this
industry’s “short-run” fluctuations.
Changes in the number of establishments
play a central role in Eating Places’ re-
sponses to the real exchange rate. In the
period of the exchange rate change, the
number of establishments increases by
0.5%. The number continues to grow
in the first year and hits its peak of
0.86% above its initial value in the sec-
ond year. As the real exchange rate
change dissipates, the number of estab-
lishments returns to its initial level. Eating
places’ average employment displays
almost no response at any horizon to
the real exchange rate change. Appar-
ently, long-run industry analysis, in which
the industry accommodates changes in
demand by changing the number of pro-
ducers while keeping the output of each
producer fixed, characterizes this in-
dustry’s short-run fluctuations. That is,
the transition from the short run to the
long run in this industry is very rapid.
For Food Stores, the number of estab-
lishments responds one year after an
increase in the real exchange rate. We
conclude for this industry that fluctua-
tions in the number of establishments
contribute significantly to its “short-run”
fluctuations. Finally, the responses of
Drinking Places to a real exchange rate
change are quite different from the
others’. The number of employees per
establishment rises dramatically when
alcoholic beverages in Canada become
more expensive than in the U.S., and the
number of establishments hardly chang-
es. This possibly reflects the well-known
licensing restrictions on alcohol sales.
Conclusion
Much of microeconomic theory assumes
that the entry of new producers responds
to persistent shocks only in the long run,
so that incumbent producers can tem-
porarily earn economic profits following
a favorable aggregate demand or cost
shock. Our results shed light on the speed
of the transition to the long run in four
retail trade industries. In Drinking Places,
persistent demand shocks arising from
cross-border shopping affect industry ac-
tivity without changing the number of
establishments. We infer from this that the
transition to the long run in that indus-
try is very slow. In the other three indus-
tries we consider, either potential entrants,
incumbent producers considering exit,
or both respond relatively rapidly to
demand shocks.
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